The popularization of the word "Fin-tech" thanks to many non-technical individuals being amazed by the unconventional way of payments, such as mobile payment over NFC. Undoubtedly speaking security/privacy is considered as the most important factor when a new Fin-tech is introduced; at least psychologically, it is. Recently Seo et al. presented an authenticated key agreement protocol for mobile payment over NFC. The protocol intended to provide secure pairing over untrusted devices with client's anonymity and forward secrecy. Unfortunately, in this paper we found that their protocol is indeed very insecure when an attacker has different levels of network controls. We presented the man-in-the-middle attacks and the replay attacks against this protocol. Under these attacks the attackers can successfully impersonate an anonymous client or can tap the communication between two legitimate clients without being detected by anyone. Then we suggested some improvements, with adequate analysis, to avoid these problems.
Introduction
Mobile-commerce (m-commerce) is defined as any electronic transaction with a mobile device and is considered the next generation e-commerce. This allows a more user friendly, more convenient, any-time-any-where model of B2C or even C2C model. However, various security problems regarding m-commerce appeared [1] , [2] that discourage the use of m-commerce. The success of m-commerce is relying on how these security issues be handled carefully and not to lose any confidence from the public.
In this paper we focus at the protocol level of m-commerce security. When a transaction happens, the system performs an authenticated key agreement protocol to authenticate the mobile user and the merchant that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the transaction. Recently, many researchers have been studying such protocols. In 2009, Yang et al. [3] proposed an efficient three-party authenticated key agreement protocol using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for m-commerce environment. However, Pu et al. [4] first discovered that Yang et al. ' s protocol suffers from unknown key-share attacks. Then, Tan et al. [5] further pointed out that their protocol is insecure against impersonation attacks and parallel attacks, and proposed an enhanced protocol. Later, Nose [6] pointed out the enhanced protocol is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks and impersonation attack. To fix the problem, He et al. [7] employed timestamps to design an ID-based protocol, while Islam et al. [8] suggested an improved protocol using hash function and ECC only with nonces.
A very recent article published on the journal by Seo et al. [9] discusses the issue about mobile payment over the near field communication (NFC). As highlighted in their paper, mobile payments have taken up a significant role nowadays. While NFC is gaining more and more trusts from end-users and is supported by more and more devices, it is a good channel to bootstrap a secure communication between mobile devices in mobile payments.
The mobile payment environment assumes the existence of an authentication server (AuC), representing a credit card issuer or similar authority that all mobile payment users have registered under it. Any payer and payee in a mobile payment transactions are modelled as a mobile user. The payee would be a card reader installed in a retail store (in B2C setting) or a mobile phone (in P2P setting), as long as these mobile users have both network connectivity to the AuC and NFC connectivities to the payer. A payer is modelled as another mobile user which can be a credit card with sufficient computation power or a mobile phone. Yet, the payer only requires to have NFC connectivities but not internet connectivity to the AuC.
According to various previous research [10] - [13] , the security requirements of an authentication protocol needed in this setting are listed below.
1) Mutual Authentication. This requires participants can be convinced that the communicating partner over the network is not being impersonated or unauthorized. 2) Forward Secrecy. This requirement states the session key established in a session will not be known to an attack if later the long term secret is exploited to an attacker. 3) Resistant to Password Guessing Attack. This requires an attacker cannot guess a user's password without being detected. 4) Resistant to Man-in-the-middle Attack. This requires an attacker cannot eavesdrop or manipulate a session content by standing in the middle of communicating parties. 5) Resistant to Replay Attack. This requires an attacker cannot interfere the protocol by replaying messages. The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Seo et al.'s protocol. In Section 3, we demonstrate that this protocol is vulnerable to several attacks. In Section 4, we propose an improved protocol. Section 5 provides a detailed security analysis of the improved protocol. Finally, we draw a conclusion in Section 6.
Review of Seo et al.'s Protocol
In this section, we review Seo et al.'s Protocol. This protocol contains two phases, the registration phase and the authenticated key agreement phase.
The registration phase is involved when a payer desires to register to the server. For example, if a payer A wants to register to an AuC, A generates a random number r A and computes APW A where APW A = h(PW A ||r A ). Note that PW A is A's password and h() means a one-way hash function. Then, A sends {ID A , APW A } to the AuC.
After receiving {ID A , APW A }, the AuC computes V A = h(ID A ||x)⊕APW A , where x is the secret key of the AuC and ⊕ denotes an exclusive-or operation. The AuC then stores {V A , PU AuC } in a smart device (or a smart card) and issues this device to A. PU AuC is the public key of the AuC. Now A also stores r A to this smart device.
The authenticated key agreement phase is involved if two users desire to establish a common session key. This phase is summarized in the Fig. 1 
Security Analysis
In this section, we present several attacks on the protocol.
A Man-in-the-middle Attack #1
The protocol is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. In this attack a middleman attacker E has a control over the NFC channel and has registered an account with the AuC. When the payer initiate the protocol by sending out {R A , CID A , MAC A }, E replaces the whole set of message by {R E , CID E , MAC E } using E's secret and sends this to the payee B. We call this communication session be Session 1. Concurrently E initiates another session and we name this as Session 2. In Session 2 E takes B's message and sends {R E , CID E , MAC E , R A , CID A , MAC A } to the AuC. Both sessions will be authenticated by the AuC while A will accept the protocol in Session 2, B will accept the protocol in Session 1. A and B will think they have established a secure connection with each other but in fact they are connected to the middle man E in two separated sessions. This is because in the authentication message sent from the AuC does not contain the identity of A or B. Therefore A or B has no way to ensure they are communicate with each other.
A Man-in-the-middle Attack #2
In this man-in-the-middle attack, the middleman attacker E has a control over the NFC channel and the public network. 
Replay Attacks and Other Attacks
This attack does not require the attacker to have control over the NFC channel. An attacker E records the messages sent by B over the public network in Step 2 and later replays it to the AuC. Since there are no further challenge and response involved, the AuC will simply accept this protocol as the message are valid and consider payer A and payee B are trying to conduct a mobile payment. This process can be further extended by mixing two separated sessions together. Let's assume a session by a payer A and a payee B were logged as Session 1 and another session by a payer C and a payee D was also logged as Session 2. The attacker E can replay part of the message from Session 1 and Session 2 to convince the AuC that payer $A$ is indeed proceeding a transaction with payee D, which is never happened.
This attack could lead to other attack patterns like impersonation attacks if the attacker has control over the public network. Say for example E is not a legitimate user. He initiates the protocol with a payee B with {R E , random, random}. E replaces the message from B by {R B , CID B , MAC B , R A , CID A , MAC A } where R A , CID A , MAC A were recorded previously. B and the AuC will accept the protocol and B will agree a session key with E.
The Improved Protocol
Mutual authentication normally requires a two-way challenge and response. Without adding additional rounds to the protocol, it is not easy to proof the one with the knowledge of the discrete log of R A and R B has also the knowledge of password and long term key. For instance, one may consider using non-interactive zero knowledge proof (NIZK) [14] , hash chains [15] , timestamps [16] , [17] , or human-verifiable hash [18] to avoid replay attacks. However, even if the protocol is secure against replay attack, it cannot be shown the protocol is secure. As a result, we propose an improved protocol in this section. Our improvement focuses on the protection against the attacks mentioned in the Section 3.
The Proposed Protocol 4.1.
In our design, there is no need to modify the registration phase. The modified authentication phase is summarized in the Fig. 2 . The detailed steps are described as follows. The AuC may be confused about the identity of the users since the MAC (MAC A and MAC B ) has the same form. We add B's ID in MAC A so that the authentication sessions and identities involved become distinguishable. 2) Both payer A and payee B should have authenticated each other through the AuC. However, under our man-in-the-middle attacks they cannot, because the authentication messages sent by the AuC are independent of identities of both A and B. 
Security Analysis of Our Proposed Protocol
To demonstrate the effect of our improvement, we analyze the improved protocol in terms of resistance to several attacks.
Resistance to the Man-in-the-middle Attack #1 5.1.
In this attack, when the payer $A$ initiates the protocol by sending out {R A , CID A , MAC A , t A }, the message will include the payee's ID, ID B . Then an adversary E replaces the whole message by {R E , CID E , MAC E , t E }, and sends it to B. When the payee B receives E's message, he will follow the protocol honestly. This is Session 1. Next, E starts another session by sending {R A , CID A , MAC A , t A , R E , CID E , MAC E , t E }. Session 1 will proceed as usual since as a registered user, E initiates a session with B. However, the attack fails when the AuC verifies the second session. In Session 2, A wants to communicate with B, but the AuC finds that the payee's ID in MAC A does not corresponds to the received one. Thus the man-in-the-middle attack #1 will not applied to our improved scheme. 
Resistance to the Man-in-the

Resistance to Replay Attacks and Other Attacks 5.3.
In these attacks, adversary records messages sent by payers or payees, and then replays them to attack the network. However, the initiation messages contain timestamps and identities in their MACs. When the AuC receives the replayed message, they will be detected immediately.
Mutual Authentication 5.4.
In our protocol, the AuC authenticates the payer and the payee by checking if 
Forward Secrecy 5.5.
In our protocol, both payer A and payee B compute the session key as SK = (R A ) b = (R B ) a = g ab , where the nonces a and b are chosen by A and B respectively. As the scheme assumes that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable, it is infeasible to compute SK as long as the nonces are unknown to an adversary. Even if the server's secret key x, the users' identities ID A and ID B , and their passwords PW A and PW B are compromised, since they are not involved in the computation, it does not help the adversary to
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crack the session keys.
Conclusion
In this paper, through our cryptanalysis of Seo et al.'s authenticated key agreement protocol based on NFC for mobile payment, we demonstrate that their protocol is not secure against man-in-the-middle attack and replay attack. In order to enhance the security, we propose an improved protocol that can resist these attacks. Also, we provide a security analysis of our improved protocol.
